We model a matching market in which nonstrategic vendors sell items of different types and offer discounted prices on the bundle of all items triggered by demand volumes. Each buyer acts strategically in order to maximize her utility, given by the difference between product valuations and price paid. In a market with transferable utility, buyers might be willing to cooperate by exchanging side-payments, to induce discounts. The core of the market is in general empty, therefore we consider a notion of stability that looks at unilateral deviations. We show that efficient matchings -the ones maximizing the social welfare -can be stabilized by transfers between buyers that enjoy desirable properties of rationality (according to which a buyer subsidizes only buyers who contribute to the activation of the desired discount) and fairness (according to which transfers amounts are balanced between buyers). Building on this existence results, and letting N , M and c be the numbers of buyers, vendors and product types, we propose a O(N 2 + N M c ) algorithm that, given an efficient matching, computes stabilizing transfers that are rational and fair, by first determining transfers between groups of buyers with an equal product choice, and then between single buyers. Our results show that if cooperation is allowed then social efficiency and stability can coexists in a market presenting subtle externalities, and determining the right amount of cooperation is computationally tractable.
I. INTRODUCTION
We model a market in which vendors offer items of different types, and each buyer is interested in purchasing a unit of each type, possibly from different vendors.
Vendors are nonstrategic. Supplies are unlimited and each vendor has a fixed price for each item. Moreover, each vendor has a discount schedule according to which the bundle of all items is offered at discounted price if her demands exceed given thresholds. This can be seen as an incentive to loyal customers who buy from a single vendor who can sustain lower sale prices DRAFT only in an economy of scale. Buyers play strategically and each selfishly tries to maximize her utility, given by the difference between the perceived value of the products and the price paid.
In order to maximize their utility, buyers might be willing to cooperate to induce vendors to activate their bundle discounts. Buyers who do not purchase any bundle (i.e., who buy from several vendors) also contribute to the activation of discounts by increasing the total demands.
The externalities present in this scenario (for which a buyer's utility depends on the choices of others) make the core of the game empty in general [15] . That is, given a market, there might not exist a configuration such that no coalition of buyers can increase their total utility by defecting.
Therefore, we consider a notion of stability that looks at deviations by single buyers rather than by coalitions of buyers. Despite it is certainly a weak notion of stability in this multi-player setup, it is suitable to model a scenario where communication and coordination between buyers is mediated by a central entity (e.g., consider an online setting in which buyers might only be able to set reserve prices).
We consider the case of transferable utility, in which utility can be transferred between buyers in the form of side-payments, to induce cooperation. To illustrate the potential benefit of sidepayments, consider a buyer who desires the bundle from a certain vendor at a discounted price.
In order to trigger the discount, she might be willing to pay a subsidy to other buyers to induce them to purchase from the same vendor (as they would otherwise switch to other vendors). Given a market configuration, or matching, we ask whether there exist transfers that stabilize it (i.e., side-payments such that no buyer wants to deviate).
Our pricing model combines ideas from auctions with reserve prices, typical of on-line shopping websites such as Ebay (where a buyer specifies the maximum amount she is willing to pay for a product), and "deal-of-the-day" on-line purchasing, made popular by Groupon and Living Social (which offer discounted gift certificates that become valid if enough people sign up to the deal). In particular, it could model an on-line market in which buyers indicate reserve prices for products from different vendors, who in turn offer discounts if enough people sign up. In the context of our model, reserve prices might represent buyers' valuations, each buyer prefers the pair of products with the higher difference between her reserve price and the selling price, and buyers might be willing to pay prices that are slightly different between each other in order to trigger deals. Even if the selling price of a product is higher than her reserve price, a buyer might be willing to purchase it if somebody else bears part of her cost. Similarly, if DRAFT a buyer's reserve price for a product choice is high enough with respect to a discounted price, then she might be willing to pay a price higher than the selling price to decrease the effective price of other buyers and induce them to buy -contributing to the activation of the discount.
In such a scenario, a stable assignment of buyers to vendors must be computed in a centralized fashion.
Given a matching that maximizes social welfare, it is easy to prove the existence of transfers that stabilize it. However, arbitrary transfers might be undesirable for buyers, and we look for transfers that enjoy additional properties of rationality and fairness. Rationality dictates that buyers who benefit from bundle discounts are the only who pay transfers, and each only subsidizes buyers who purchase (at least one item) from her same vendor (as they might be necessary to trigger the discount). This is motivated by the willingness of each buyer to subsidize only buyers she benefits from. Fairness dictates that buyers pay transfers that are proportional to their surplus, that is, the difference between her current utility and the utility of their best alternative. In order to motivate this notion of fairness, observe that it might be undesirable for a buyer to pay a disproportionately large amount of the transfer needed by the buyers she benefits from if there are other buyers willing to contribute to the payment (although, from the strict point of view of stability, a buyer might be willing to transfer an amount up to her entire surplus, independently of the transfers paid by others).
Summary of results:
Our results show that if cooperation is allowed then social efficiency and stability can coexists in a market presenting complex externalities, and determining the right amount of cooperation is computationally tractable.
In Section III, we show that, given any matching that maximizes the social welfare (or SWM matching), there exist rational transfers that stabilize it (Theorem 1 in Section III). This means that efficient matchings are also stable up to suitable transfers (the price of stability is one, a property that is not always observed in games [9] , [20] ). To prove this, we partition buyers according to their choices and surplus: on the one side, groups of "rich" buyers getting the same discounted bundle and with a positive surplus (i.e., willing to pay transfers); on the other side, groups of "poor" buyers with the same product choice and negative surplus (i.e., in need of subsidy). Then, we show that there are "rational" transfers between groups of buyers such that: each rich group subsidize poor groups with at least one vendor in common; each rich group transfer at most their available surplus; and each poor group receive the necessary subsidy. Group DRAFT transfers can be translated into rational and stabilizing transfers. This existence result constitutes the main contribution of this work, and its proof is based on the construction of a graph which encodes the transfers between groups of buyers and has no edges if and only if the transfers are rational.
In Section IV, we show how transfers that are rational and fair and stabilize the market can be efficiently computed given a SWM matching. First, group transfers are computed via the FordFulkerson algorithm for the maximum flow on a network such that rational group transfers and feasible flows are in one-to-one correspondence (Section IV-A). Then, rational and fair transfers who stabilize the SWM matching are computed (Section IV-B). Section V deals with the computation of SWM matchings. A natural approach consists in a mixed integer program, see [18] , requiring time exponential in N and M, and whose relaxation is not guaranteed to have integral solutions (i.e., corresponding to valid matchings). Conditional on the number of buyers assigned to each pair of vendors, we compute a SWM matching in time Θ(N 2 M c ) via the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm for the maximum flow with minimum cost on a network such that maximum flows and feasible matchings are in one-to-one correspondence.
Computing a SWM matching requires to consider a number of cases of the order of N M c , and this term dominates the computational complexity. Getting rid of the exponential dependency on M does not seem possible, due to the theoretical hardness of the problem. However, the overall time complexity is polynomial in N, and usually M can be assumed much smaller than N or even constant.
We conclude with a discussion in Section VI. 1 Consider two functions f (x) and g(x) of a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn). We say that f (x) = O(g(x)) if there exist constants
for all x such that min 1≤i≤n xi ≥ M . We say that f (x) = Ω(g(x)) if there exist constants
and f (x) = Ω(g(x)).
DRAFT
Related work: Matching models have always received considerable attention by computer scientists [18] , [16] , [8] , [10] and economists [19] , [4] , [17] , [6] , [5] , [2] , as they constitute the abstraction of many real world strategic scenarios in which choice requires mutual agreement.
Examples are retail markets, the labor market, college admissions, and the assignment of residents to hospitals. When externalities are present in the market, stability often becomes problematic [6] , [21] . In our model, the externalities are the numbers of buyers purchasing each product from each vendor, as they determine who benefits from discounts.
Online retailing has seen a continuous growth during the last two decades [13] , and recently "deal of the day" websites such as Groupon and Living Social have introduced a new form of buying, in which enough buyers must sign up for a deal to be valid. An overview of the literature on group-buying in the web is given by [1] and by [11] . Due to the interdependencies between buyers' choices and utility, the core of the market is nonempty only under specific assumptions about preferences or discounts [7] , [3] .
This paper is also related to and motivated by [14] , that considers a more basic model with a single product on the market and where each vendor activates multiple discounts at increasing demand volumes. The novelty of our contribution with respect to [14] is twofold. On the one hand, we extend their model to the more general case of multiple products on the market and to the possibility for vendors to activate discount on bundles of items rather then single items.
As discounts can be triggered by buyers who do not necessarily benefit from them, proving the existence of (rational) transfers that stabilize the market is nontrivial and necessitates an inductive argument on the market size (see Section III). We remark that our model, results and algorithms can be extended to the case of more than two products on the market and of more complex discount schedules (see Section VI), therefore including [14] as a special case. On the other hand, we also consider the computational side of stability, by proposing a simple and efficient algorithm to compute transfers that stabilize the market and enjoy desirable properties of rationality and fairness.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a market M consisting in a set of N buyers B and a set of M vendors S. Each vendor sells items (or products) of c types denoted by 1, . . . , c, and we assume supplies are vendor s ⊥ will be pointed out. Let S c denote the cartesian product of c copies of S.
A matching is a set of tuples µ ⊂ B×S c such that each b ∈ B appears in exactly a single tuple.
A matching represents buyers' choices and, fors = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s c ) ∈ S c , (b,s) ∈ µ denotes that b ∈ B purchases item k from vendor s k for k = 1, . . . , c. We write µ(b) =s, and µ
Given a matching µ, for eachs ∈ S c , letμ(s) = {b ∈ B : µ(b) =s} be the set of buyers who purchase item k from vendor s k for all k ∈ C, and let n(s) = |μ(s)| be its cardinality. Given a matching µ, for each s ∈ S and k ∈ C, letμ k (s) = {b ∈ B : µ k (b) = s} be the set of buyers who purchase item k from vendor s and n
as the demand vector of vendor s (where N is the set of nonnegative integers). Let τ 0 (s) = (0, . . . , 0). Let τ 1 (s ⊥ ) = (∞, . . . , ∞) for the null vendor s ⊥ . We also assume that s has h prices p (i)
Prices
Given a matching µ, with corresponding demand vector n(s) = (n 1 (s), . . . , n c (s)) for vendor s, s offers the bundle of all items C at a cumulative price p
That is, s offers the bundle of all products at the price corresponding to the largest demand threshold vector that is met component-wise.
If s activates one of her discounts, then a buyer b such that µ
buys all items from s) pays a price p
be the set of vendors who activate a discount under the matching µ.
Utility: Each buyer b ∈ B has a valuation for each possible product choices ∈ S c . The
e., the choice not to buy any item has zero valuation).
Given a matching µ, each b ∈ B has quasi-linear utility function given by
where p b (µ) is the price paid by b under the matching µ. Given a matching µ, the price
is computed as follows. If µ k (b) = s for some s ∈ T (µ) and all k ∈ C then b pays the price
corresponding to the largest threshold that is met. Otherwise b pays k∈C p
, that is, the sum of the base price for each single item.
Buyers play strategically, and each tries to maximize her utility. The social welfare SW (µ) of a matching µ is the sum of all buyers' utilities.
Transferable utility: We consider markets with transferable utility. That is, utility can be transferred between buyers in the form of side-payments, made in order to induce cooperation.
To illustrate the potential benefit of side-payments, consider a scenario in which the best option for buyer b is to buy all items from vendor s at a discounted price. In order to purchase the desired products at a low price, b might be willing to bear some of the cost incurred by other users purchasing one or multiple items from s, which would otherwise choose other vendors.
DRAFT
For each b, b ′ ∈ B, let t b→b ′ ≥ 0 denote the transfer from b to b ′ . Let t denote the vector of transfers between all pairs of buyers. Given matching µ and transfer vector t, let (µ, t) be the market configuration in which buyers choose items according to µ and transfers t are exchanged.
The utility of b ∈ B under (µ, t) is given by
, where the sum is the net amount of transfer received by b. Under the assumption of transferable utility,
given a matching µ, we ask whether there exist transfers t such that (µ, t) is stable, according to a suitable notion of stability.
As a remark, transfers are not equivalent to buyers becoming intermediaries. In fact, a buyer might in general subsidize only a fraction of the transfer needed by another buyer, and a buyer might receive transfer from multiple other buyers.
Stability:
The strongest notion of stability for a market configuration is to exhibit the core property [15] . A matching-transfer pair (µ, t), has the core property if no coalition of buyers can increase their total utility by deviating from µ. Maximizing the social welfare is necessary condition for the core property (otherwise all buyers can increase their social welfare by deviating to a SWM matching). However, the core of a market M (the set of matching-transfer pairs with the core property) can be empty (refer to the example in Section VII). We therefore turn our attention to a notion of stability which looks at deviations by single users rather than groups of users Given a matching-transfer pair (µ, t), there are two ways a buyer b can deviate from it. First, b might deviate by changing her product choice (resulting in a matching
In this case b's utility would be given by the difference between her valuation of the newly chosen product pair and the price paid. We assume that, after defection, b will not be involved in any transfer (as this would not constitute an unilateral action by b), and that she cannot enjoy any discount (as other buyers might not allow b to enjoy discounts without paying transfers). Therefore, we assume that after deviation, b pays the base prices of the chosen products. Second, b might deviate by dropping her transfers in full or in part. A buyer b who enjoys a discount from s ∈ T (µ) can benefit from other buyers purchasing from vendor s as they can trigger a lower price for b. In this case, b's payoff after defection assumes that buyers loose incentive to buy from vendor in s, resulting in a price increase. That is, we assume that b dropping her transfers results in the deviation by both subsidized and nonsubsidized buyers purchasing from s. This assumption does not affect the validity of our results, as we will look at stabilizing SWM matchings: any SWM matching minimizes the number of DRAFT buyers that need to be subsidized in order to trigger a given price, and the deviation of each of these buyers would result in a price increase. Letting µ and µ ′ be respectively the matching before and after defection by b, we have that
, in both cases of
The following definition formalizes the notion of stability just presented.
Definition 2: A matching-transfer pair (µ, t) is stable if no buyer can unilaterally and profitably
Given a matching µ, let u * b (µ) be the maximum utility b can achieve by deviating from µ, and let Given a SWM matching µ, the existence of a stabilizing transfer is trivial to prove. Observe that, maximizing the social welfare is sufficient but not necessary for the existence of stabilizing transfers (see counterexample in Section VIII).
Rational and fair transfers:
We are not interested in arbitrary transfers, as they could be undesirable for certain buyers. Observe that not all buyers are willing to pay transfers. Under a matching µ, a buyer b is willing to pay transfers to other buyers only if the price paid by b under µ is strictly smaller than the sum of the base prices of the chosen items (i.e., b buys all products from a single s ∈ T (µ)) and b has positive surplus.
Consider buyers b and b ′ such that b buys all products from a single s ∈ T (µ), σ b (µ) > 0 and The reason is that these buyers might be necessary to trigger the discount b currently benefits of, and they might defect if they do not receive any transfer. Moreover, if two buyers purchase the same items from the same vendors and have the same surplus, it would be undesirable for one of them to pay a higher transfer than the other. We consider the following definitions of rationality and fairness. 
III. EXISTENCE OF RATIONAL AND STABILIZING TRANSFERS
Our main result states that, maximizing the social welfare is sufficient condition for the existence of rational and stabilizing transfers. For each s ∈ T (µ), let
be the set of buyers who purchase all items from vendor s (at a discounted price) and have positive surplus. For s / ∈ T (µ) let P(s) = ∅. Each b ∈ P(s) is willing to pay transfers up to σ b (µ) to buyers who have negative surplus and purchase at least a product k ∈ C from s, for a total of
For s / ∈ T (µ), let P (s) = 0.
For each subset of vendors x ⊆ S, let
be the set of buyers who purchase items from all and only the vendors in x and have negative surplus. Observe that N (x) = ∅ for all |x| > c, so we will implicitly assume |x| ≤ c. In order DRAFT not to deviate from µ by switching to her best alternative, each b ∈ N (x) must receive a transfer of −σ b (µ), for a total of
According to Definition 4, given rational transfers t, if b ∈ P(s) and b ′ ∈ N (x) for some
x ⊆ S such that s / ∈ x then t b→b ′ = 0.
As a remark, given a SWM matching µ, if s / ∈ T (µ) for all s ∈ x ⊆ S then N (x) = ∅, otherwise, a matching with higher social welfare is obtained if buyers N (x) switch to their best alternatives. 4 Group transfers: In the proof of Theorem 1, we will consider transfers between groups of buyers rather than transfers between single buyers. This is enough as transfers between single buyers can be computed from group transfers in arbitrary ways (we provide a computationally efficient way which also guarantees fairness in Section IV-B). In particular, for s ∈ S and x ⊆ S,
t b→b ′ be the total transfer from buyers P(s) to buyers N ({s}). If transfers t are rational thent s→x = 0 whenever s / ∈ x (and the group transfers are said to be rational). To prove Theorem 1, we need to show that there exist group transferst such that
The first two constraints require that the matching µ can be stabilized by group transferst, while the third constraint requirest to be rational. Group transferst satisfying (1) are said rational and stabilizing. We consider the following definition of cross-transfer.
Definition 6: For s ∈ S and x ⊆ S, group transferst s→x is a cross-transfer if s / ∈ x.
Group transfert are rational if all cross-transfers are zero. Transfers t (between buyers) are rational if and only if all cross-transfers (between groups) are zero. 4 In particular, if s / ∈ T (µ), then N ({s}) = ∅. Buyers N ({s}) are the ones who purchase all items from s and have negative surplus. When we restrict our attention to rational transfers, buyers N ({s}) can only receive transfer from buyers P(s). 
Proof of Theorem 1:
We assume µ is a SWM matching. We proceed by contradiction, making the following assumption. Definition 8: Given group transferst, the cross-transfer graph G(t) is the directed graph with node set equal to S, and directed edge (s, s ′ ) if and only if there exist x ⊆ S such that s / ∈ x, s ′ ∈ x,t s→x > 0.
In words, in G(t) there is an edge from s ∈ S to s ′ ∈ S if buyers P(s) pay a cross-transfer to buyers N (x) for some x ⊆ S such that s / ∈ x, s ′ ∈ x. An example of cross-transfer graph is given in FIgure 1 .
The following results state that rational group transfers correspond to cross-transfer graphs with no edges, and that we can restrict our attention to directed acyclic graphs.
Lemma 1: Group transferst are rational if and only if G(t) has no edge.
Lemma 2: Given group transferst, there exist equivalent group transferst ′ such that the corresponding cross-transfer graph G(t ′ ) is acyclic.
The proof of Lemma 1 follows by the definition of cross-transfer graph and is therefore omitted.
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Section IX.
Without loss of generality, consider stabilizing group transferst and assume that G(t) is a directed acyclic graph. By Assumption 1, there are no equivalent group transferst ′ such that DRAFT Fig. 1 . Example of a cross-transfer graph. Assume that S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, and that the only nonzero cross-transfers arē
According to Definition 8, G(t) has nodes {s1, s2, s3, s4} and directed edges {(s1, s4), (s1, s4), (s2, s4)}.
G(t ′ ) has no edge. A vendor s ∈ S is called a source node if there is no edge (s
and an internal node otherwise. Let S SRC ⊆ S be the set of vendors corresponding to source nodes in G(t ′ ). Let S IN ⊆ S be the set of vendors corresponding to internal nodes in G(t ′ ). Let Similarly, let
According to G(t ′ ), buyers P IN are not able to pay the total amount of transfer needed by buyers N IN , and additional transfer from P SRC is needed (observe that the latter buyers get no benefit from the product choice of buyers N IN ). Under Assumption 1, letting 
generating a contradiction with the assumption that µ is a SWM matching.
IV. COMPUTATION OF FAIR TRANSFERS
Given a market M and a SWM matching µ, Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of rational and stabilizing transfers. In this section we present an efficient procedure to compute rational and stabilizing transfers that are also fair according to Definition 5. Recall that N, M and c are the numbers of buyers, sellers and product types, respectively. We assume that a SWM matching µ is given, and we proceed as follows. In Section IV-A we show how to compute rational and stabilizing group transferst s→x from P(s) to N (x) for all s ∈ S, x ⊆ S (|x| ≤ c), via the 5 Matching µ ′ is the results of a deviation from µ by multiple buyers. We do not directly use this deviation to proof the stability of a matching-transfer pair (whose definition looks at unilateral deviations). We use µ ′ to derive a contradiction on the assumption that µ is a SWM matching. 6 Even if for the sake of stability buyers cannot enjoy discounts after deviation, here we consider that discount thresholds might be triggered as we are interested in computing the social welfare of µ ′ . 7 It is necessary to assume that also buyers P IN deviate to their best alternatives, as their surplus σ b (µ) depends on their best alternatives given the matching-transfer pair (µ, t).
DRAFT
Given rational and stabilizing group transfers, in Section IV-B we show how to compute rational and stabilizing transfers between buyers that are fair according to Definition 5. This
A. Step 1: rational and stabilizing group transfers
We consider the following flow network G (refer to Figure 2 ). Nodes are as follows.
-A single source node r, and a single sink node t.
-A node v x for each x ⊆ S, |x| ≤ c, corresponding to N (x). There are O(M c ) such nodes.
-A node u s for each s ∈ S, corresponding P(s). There are M such nodes.
Edges and capacities are as follows.
-For each node v x , an edge from r to v x with capacity N(x). Flow from s to v x represents the total transfer to N (x). There are O(M c ) such edges.
-For each node v x , and edge from v x to u s for all s ∈ x, each with capacity N(x). Flow from v x to u s represents the group transfer from P(s) to N (x). There are O(M c ) such edges (as each node v x has at most a constant number c of outgoing edges).
-For each node u s , an edge from u s to t with capacity P (s). Flow from u s to t represents the total transfer given by P(s). There are M such edges.
Given a flow f on the network G, f (x, y) represents the flow from node x to node y. Let F (N ) be the set of all feasible flows on G and T (M) be the set of all rational group transfers in the market M (given the SWM matching µ). Consider the mapping ω :
such that a feasible flow f ∈ F (N ) is mapped to group transferst = ω(f ) such that:
Observe that the capacity constraints on edges (u s , t), s ∈ S imply that xt s→x ≤ P (s) for all s ∈ S.t is rational as in G there is no edge (v x , u s ) for s / ∈ x.
Proposition 1: The mapping ω : F (N ) → T (M) is a bijection. Let f * be a maximum flow on G. Then, ω(f * ) defines rational and stabilizing group transfers.
The proof is given in Section X. We can therefore compute rational and stabilizing group transfers via the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm for the maximum flow (see for example [12] ). To bound the running time of the algorithm, we assume that the capacities of all edges in G are integer, that is, DRAFT Fig. 2 . Scheme of the flow network G. A single node v x for a set x = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } ⊆ S is represented. There is an edge from the source r to v x with capacity N (x), to accommodate the total transfer needed by N (x). For i = 1, 2, 3, there is an edge from v x to u si with capacity N (x), to accommodate the transfer from P(s i ) to N (x).
For i = 1, 2, 3, there is an edge from u si to the sink t with capacity P (s i ), to accommodate the total transfer from P(s i ) (transfer not only to N (x)).
all terms P (s) and N(x) are integer. This is the case if valuations and prices are multiples of the same unit (e.g., dollars or cents). For a network with n nodes, e edges, integer capacities, and the total capacity of the edges exiting the source equal to T , the running time of the algorithm 
B. Step 2: transfer between buyers
In this section we show how rational, fair and stabilizing transfers between buyers can be computed from rational and stabilizing group transfers. Observe that each buyer b ∈ B belongs at most to a single set P(s) for some s ∈ S or to a single set N (x) for some x ⊆ S, |x| ≤ c.
We consider the following definition of fairness, equivalent to Definition 5 when we restrict our attention to stabilizing transfers.
Definition 9: Given a market M and a SWM matching µ, rational and stabilizing transfers t (with corresponding group transferst) are fair if, for each s ∈ S such that P(s) = ∅ and each b ∈ P(s), the total transfer paid by b is
DRAFT
Observe that all buyers P(s) are required to pay a cumulative transfer of xt s→x to buyers
x N (x), out of an available cumulative surplus of P (s) = b∈P(s) σ b (µ). Under rational, fair and stabilizing group transferst, Condition (1) guarantees that no buyer with σ b (µ) > 0 pays more than σ b (µ), and that each buyer with σ b (µ) < 0 can receive the required side-payment.
We now present our algorithm to compute rational and fair stabilizing transfers from rational and stabilizing group transfers. First, t b→b ′ is initialized at zero for each b, b ′ ∈ B. Fair transfers from buyers P(s) (for a fixed s ∈ S such that P(s) = ∅) are computed by algorithm A 1 (in Table 1 ), as follows.
Assume thatt s→x > 0 for x = x 1 , . . . , x h (with s ∈ x k for all k = 1, . . . , h), as output by the algorithm in Section IV-A. Observe that h = O(M c−1 ) as we are considering sets x such that |x| ≤ c and s ∈ x.
For each b ∈ P(s), at any given point in the execution of the algorithm,σ b denotes b's residual surplus, that is, the amount b has still available to make side-payments. At initialization,
Transfers to buyers N (x k ) are computed in phases, in increasing order of
be the ratio between the group transfer from P(s) to N (x k ) and the residual surplus of P(s), and let β =t s→x k /N(x k ) be the fraction of transfer that N (x k ) receives from P(s), out of the total transfer from ∪ s ′ ∈x k P(s ′ ).
Algorithm A 2 in Table 2 computes transfers between buyers P(s) to buyers N (x k ) such that each b ∈ P(s) transfers ασ b (µ) and each b ′ ∈ N (x k ) receives −βσ b ′ (µ). Before increasing the value of k, each b ∈ P(s) updates her residual surplus to
The correctness of algorithm A 2 is straightforward. Given this, the correctness of algorithm A 1 follows by observing that, for each s ∈ S and b ∈ P(s), b's transfer in each instance of algorithm A 2 never exceedσ b , and that for each x ⊆ S, |x| ≤ c and b
Time complexity: Let T A 1 (s) and T A 2 (s, x) be the number of operations required, respectively, by algorithm A 1 for buyers in P(s), and by algorithm A 2 to compute transfers from P(s) to N (x). The total time to compute fair, rational and stabilizing transfers is
, where the first terms accounts for the initialization of t.
We have that T Initialize:σ b = σ b (µ) for each b ∈ P(s);
To upper bound T A 1 (s), each iteration of the for loop requires O(|P(s)|) operations to compute s, and T A 2 (s, x) operations for the execution of algorithm A 2 . Therefore, the cumulative running time is upper bounded by
as s∈S |P(s)| ≤ N, s∈S |x|≤c:s∈x |N (x)| ≤ cN, and |{x ⊆ S :
Combining with the result in Section IV-A, fair, rational and stabilizing transfers between buyers can be computed in time O(N 2 + NM c ) given a SWM matching. Instead, we follow a different approach, similar to [14] . Conditional on the number of buyers partitions such that each of the N buyers can be assigned to a single pair of vendors.
Fix π ∈ Π, and define a flow network G(π) as follows (see Figure 3) . Nodes are the following.
-For each b ∈ B, a node b. There are N such nodes.
-For eachs ∈ S c , a nodes. There are M c such nodes.
The edges, with corresponding capacities and costs, are as follows. To determine the SWM matching of M, for each π ∈ Π we need to determine, a SWM DRAFT matching conditional on π, for an overall time Θ(N 2 M c |Π|). However, this is dominated by a term N M c (see Section XI).
Getting rid of the exponential dependency in M does not seem possible, due to the theoretical hardness of the problem. In fact, fixed x > 0, deciding whether there exists a matching µ with SW (µ) ≥ x is NP-hard, (by a reduction from the Knapsack problem, as noted by [14] ). Even if computationally demanding even for small M, the proposed solution requires time polynomial in the number of buyers N. Our solution is significantly more efficient than both the exhaustive maximization of social welfare over all M 2N matchings, and solving the integer problem above (both exponential in N). Moreover, M could in general be considered much smaller than N, or even constant.
VI. DISCUSSION
It is an open question whether Theorem 1 holds in the case of arbitrary price schedules, where a vendor might have several discounted prices on sets of products, as described next. Let C = {x ⊆ C} be the partition of C (i.e., the set of all 2 c subsets of C). The price schedule p s of vendor s ∈ S is a mapping from N c × C to R + (the set of nonnegative real numbers), such that, for n ∈ N c and x ∈ C, p s (n, x) is the price for the bundle of products x offered by s under demand n. Let p s (n, ∅) = 0 for each s and n. We require that p s (m, x) ≤ p s (n, x) for all x ∈ C if m ≥ n component-wise. Letting e k be the unit vector with the k-th component equal to one and all other components equal to zero, we refer to p k s = p s (e k , {k}) as the base price of item k offered by s. The price paid by b under matching µ is determined as follows. For each s ∈ S, let x b (s) = {k ∈ C : µ k (b) = s} be the set of items b purchases from s. Recalling that n(s)
denotes the demand vector of s under the matching µ,
.
might be willing to pay transfers. Finally, we observe that buyers might benefit from misreporting their product valuations. 
The matching µ such that µ(b 1 ) = µ(b 2 ) = (s 1 , s 1 ) and µ(b 3 ) = (s 3 , s 3 ) has SW (µ) = 13/2 and is not SWM (the matching µ 
Then, we assume that the shortest cycles in G(t) have length K > 2 and let K = s 1 , . . . , s K , s K+1
(with s K , s K+1 ) be such a cycle. We show that there exist equivalent group transferst ′ such that G(t ′ ) has a cycle of length K − 1 obtained by replacing two adjacent edges of K with a single edge. This completes the proof as each cycle can be reduced to a length-two cycle by iterating the argument and finally to a single edge.
Assume G(t) contains edges (s 1 , s 2 ) and (s 2 , s 1 ). Let X 1 = {x ⊆ S : s 1 / ∈ x, s 2 ∈ x,t s 1 →x > 0}, X 2 = {x ⊆ S : s 2 / ∈ x, s 1 ∈ x,t s 2 →x > 0}. be respectively the total amount of cross-transfer that buyers P(s 1 ) pay to all buyers N (x), x ∈ X 1 and that buyers P(s 2 ) pay to buyers N (x), x ∈ X 2 . Suppose that t s 1 ≤ t s 2 . We define equivalent group transferst ′ such that
where buyers P(s 1 ) switch a cumulative amount of transfer t s 1 from buyers N (x), x ∈ X 1 to buyers N (x), x ∈ X 2 , 
Each group N (x), x ∈ X 1 receives the missing amount of transfer from buyers P(s 2 ), t ′ s 2 →x =t s 2 →x +t s 1 →x for each x ∈ X 1 ,
DRAFT for a total of t s 1 . Buyers P(s 2 ) decrease the cross-transfer to buyers N (x), x ∈ X 2 by total amount t s 1 ,
The existence of equivalent group transferst ′ such that (2)- (5) hold is straightforward. Observe thatt ′ s 1 →x = 0 for all x ∈ X 1 , and therefore (s 1 , s 2 ) / ∈ G(t ′ ). If t s 2 − t s 1 > 0 thent ′ s 2 →x > 0 for some x ∈ X 2 and (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ G(t ′ ), otherwise (s 1 , s 2 ) / ∈ G(t ′ ). The proof in the case of t s 1 > t s 2 similarly follows.
Assume now that the shortest cycles in G(t) have length K > 2, and let K be a shortest cycle. That is, K is formed by edges (s i , s i+1 ) for i = 1, . . . , K, with s K+1 = s 1 . For each k = 1, . . . , K let X k = {x ⊆ S : s k / ∈ x, s k+1 ∈ x,t s k →x > 0},
Without loss of generality, assume that s 1 ∈ arg min s k ∈K t s k , that is t s 1 ≤ t s k for all k = 2, . . . , K (which is always true up to node relabeling). By the assumption that K is a cycle of minimum length, there is no chord in G(t ′ ), that is (s k , s j ) / ∈ G(t ′ ) if s k , s j ∈ K, s j = s k+1 . We build group transferst ′ which are equivalent tot and such that (s 1 , s 2 ) / ∈ G(t ′ ) and (s i , s i+1 ) for i = 2, . . . , K with s K+1 = s 2 is a cycle of length K − 1 in G(t ′ ).
Group transferst
′ are defined such that t ′ s 1 →x = 0 for each x ∈ X 1 ,
and buyers P(s 1 ) switch a cumulative amount of transfer t s 1 from buyers N (x), x ∈ X 1 to buyers N (x), x ∈ X K , 
Each group N (x), x ∈ X 1 receives the missing amount of transfer from buyers P(s K ),
DRAFT for a total of t s 1 . Buyers P(s K ) decrease the cross-transfer to buyers N (x), x ∈ X K by total amount t s 1 ,
The existence of equivalent group transferst ′ such that (6)- (9) hold is straightforward. Observe thatt ′ s 1 →x = 0 for all x ∈ X 1 , and therefore (s 1 , s 2 ) / ∈ G(t ′ ). Buyers P(s K ) pay a transfer of t s 1 to groups N (x), x ∈ X 1 . This last contribution is a cross-transfer as s K / ∈ x, s 2 ∈ x for each x ∈ X 1 because (s 1 , s K ) / ∈ G(t). Therefore (s K , s 2 ) ∈ G(t ′ ). Moreover, if t s K − t s 1 > 0 then t ′ s K →x > 0 for some x ∈ X K and (s K , s 1 ) ∈ G(t ′ ), otherwise (s K , s 1 ) / ∈ G(t ′ ). This completes the proof.
X. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
It is straightforward to see that ω is a bijection, so we only prove the second part of the claim. First, suppose that P (s) < x:s∈xt s→x for some s ∈ S. This would imply that the flow entering node u s is larger than the capacity of the edge (u s , t), generating a contradiction with the feasibility of the maximum flow f * . Second, suppose that N(x) > s∈xt s→x for some x ⊆ S, |x| ≤ c. This would imply that every flow f ′ on G is smaller than x N(x), and therefore there exist no group transferst ′ such that N(x) = s∈xt s→x ∀x ⊆ S for all x ⊆ S, generating a contradiction with Theorem 1 (as feasible flows and rational group transfers are in one-to-one correspondence). Rationality oft implies thatt s→x = 0 if s / ∈ x.
XI. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY FOR DETERMINING SWM MATCHINGS
We have that |Π| = N +M c −1 M c −1
